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This article explores the political-theological nature of Sayyid Qutb’s theoretical design, 
specifically its relation to non-Western understandings of sovereignty, and its principal 
anomalies arising from the struggle of reconciling the notions of the modern state with 
undefined territorial imaginings of a religious community. Repudiating reformist variants of 
modernist Islam, Qutb’s writings afford an alternate reading of modern sovereignty as it is 
reconfigured in the language of hakimiyyah (God’s sovereignty). A political reading of 
sovereignty in Qutb complicates the assumed separation between political and non-political 
spheres. The argument recognizes a basic distinction between the idea of sovereignty in a 
theological sense and its political counterpart. In Qutb’s design, however, the absence of 
determinate lines between the theological and the political leaves few autonomous social 
spheres outside God’s law. Whilst Qutb’s vision does not exhaust political Islam2—a  
fairly heterodox field of diverse perspectives and commitments—the appeal of his writings 
remains forceful, especially under conditions of Islam’s perceived defensiveness in the face of 
secularist global modernity and its institutionalized forms. The article situates Qutb within the 
expanding repertoire of non-Western understandings of the political logic of International 
Relations.    
Introduction  
The rediscovery of political theology in recent International Relations (IR) discourses 
underscores both the infirmity of secularist renditions of the international as well as the 
difficulty, if not impossibility, of disentangling the mystical and the political (Paipais, 2015; 
Guilhot, 2010; Troy 2013). Received interventions challenge mainstream IR’s long standing  
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and inescapable reliance on notions of secularization (Philpott 2002; Fitzgerald 2011), 
conceived either as an emancipatory rupture from the prison-house of religion promised in 
classic accounts (Blumenberg 1983), or as a reworked Protestant spatio-temporal resolution 
of the problem of reconciling universality with particularity (Walker 1993). In the received 
canon, secularization has always instantiated modernity’s self-subsistent character, 
legitimating new horizons of human fulfillment. The ‘modern age’ decenters God in favor of 
humanity; it consolidates the ascendancy of Reason over Faith, and cultivates forms of 
individuated subjectivity no longer deformed by irrational collectivist attachments to religion. 
A key feature of secularization is the banishment of religion from the public realm and its 
relegation to the ‘private’. Secularization envisions a sharp divide between a public, non-
religious (or ‘secular) realm and a private realm in which religion may or may not thrive. The 
separation of religion from the State marks its modern character. Secularization is also a 
marker of the cultural or civilizational divide between the West and Islam. Apparently absent 
in the Islamic Cultural Zones (ICZs),3 the inseparability of the religious and the secular casts 
these regions as areas of a pre-political world. The Westphalian model rests largely on a 
disavowal of religion, superimposing the inside/outside divide onto a religious/secular 
separation; modern sovereignty and secularization are indivisible in IR.  Extended into 
international space, the secular settlement secured by/within modernity acquires a 
determinate and visible form. The ‘return of religion’ merely confirms the stubbornness of 
the Westphalian frame. However, it is principally in the non-Western cultural zones that this 
return appears to generate potent effects. Despite religion’s reappearance in Western social 
and cultural life, it seems to rarely disturb the foundations of the liberal-secular order. On 
established common sense, sovereignty remains unaffected by religious distempers.  
Alternatively, secularization has been seen merely as a guise for the theological 
origins and make-up of the political (Schmitt 1985[1922]; Löwith 1949): modernity rests 
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firmly on religion, unable to inaugurate a basic rupture from the latter’s grasp (Gillespie 
2008). Hence, all political concepts, especially sovereignty, are in essence, theological, as 
Schmitt (1985[1922]) famously reminds us. Recent investigations register a shift away from 
received Westphalian orthodoxy and its underlying ideational structures. Firstly, after 
decades of exile, sovereignty appears to have returned to its political-theological home. The 
reworking of Carl Schmitt in the IR discipline (Odysseos & Petito 2007), or the intervention 
by the notable Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben (Prozorov 2014), are important 
instances of the indivisibility of the theological and the political. Secondly, the emergence 
and spread of non-Western perspectives within the IR have underscored the desire to 
transcend the strictures of liberal-secular variants of sovereignty (Shilliam 2011; Grovogui 
2002). On this view, the career of sovereignty in the postcolonial world follows different 
pathways. The colonial experience, notably, has left behind ‘regimes of sovereignty’ 
(Grovogui 2002), marked by notions of legitimate authority and morality that do not mirror 
the Westphalian ideal-type. For scholars privileging the ‘pure’ form of statehood found in the 
West in relation to the ‘Third World’, the perceived dissonance between domestic and 
external aspects of sovereignty gives the postcolonial state simply the status of ‘quasi-states’. 
Despite their recognition as ‘nation-states’ internationally, postcolonial states are unable to 
inhabit features of proper statehood internally (Jackson 1990). Similarly, scholars with acute 
historical sensibility recognize a close nexus between imperialism and international law, or 
imperialism and sovereignty (Anghie 2005).   
The present article situates the prominent Islamic thinker, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) 
within this growing ‘non-Western’ literature on sovereignty, but it also stresses Qutb’s 
departure from largely secularist mappings in this literature. On the whole, non-Western 
perspectives on sovereignty rest perilously upon secularist mappings of international space 
despite claims of recognizing difference and alterity. Without engaging alternative political-
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theological fields, analyses of non-Western sovereignty cannot probe the deeper sources of 
notions of legitimate authority, justice, and rule in the Islamic world. The search for the 
presence or absence of ‘functional’ equivalents in postcolonial political thinking and behavior 
diminishes these perspectives, implicitly replicating modernization theories. Appealing 
mainly to Islamic discursive and political spaces, Qutb’s corpus profoundly challenges extant 
Western and postcolonial constructions of sovereignty. His notion of hakimiyyah, for 
instance, is a political reading of God’s rule, His suzerainty and His Kingdom.4 All human 
arrangements lack the essential property of sovereignty. Any attempt to institute lay 
sovereignty is tantamount to shirk (idolatry) for Qutb.   
Qutb is ambivalent on the formula for establishing an Islamic State within the (post-) 
Westphalian system of states; he resists the temptation to sacralize sovereignty since 
modernity and its secular productions are inherently godless and illegitimate. No earthly 
model can reproduce God’s rule; the task is to embrace hakimiyyah in its totality. Unqualified 
acceptance of hakimiyyah might generate a more just State. In this sense, Qutb departs from 
‘fundamentalist’ thinkers offering elaborate schemata for the establishment of an Islamic 
state. Unsurprisingly, Qutb is vehemently contested by ‘reformist’ as well as ‘fundamentalist’ 
protagonists of political Islam. In no small measure, Qutb’s rejection of all human 
constructions of sovereignty is a major source of opposition to his ideas. On Qutb’s reading, 
modernity is a project of re-sacralization of the state. However, since Qutb offers few clues to 
the riddle of transcending the crucial distinction between the idea of sovereignty in a 
theological sense and the idea of sovereignty in a political sense,5 he is left with an aporia of 
instituting hakimiyyah on Earth. An Islamic state would merely imitate modernity’s re-
sacralization. On the other hand, without an Islamic state, hakimiyyah would remain 
unhinged from lay political authority.  
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This article interrogates this aporia in three interlinked sections. In the first section, 
Qutb’s political theology is read, not as a sacralized variant of ‘modern’ sovereignty, but as 
the politicization of the sacred. Qutb’s reading of Divine sovereignty tends to demonstrate 
remarkable features of the modern Leviathan. He is not simply inverting the modern logic of 
sovereignty. The second section focusses on Qutb’s twin notions of hakimiyyah and 
jahiliyyah. These notions are critical to Qutb’s project. His reworking of the traditional notion 
of jahiliyyah6, giving it a trans-historical, decontextualized connotation introduces a new 
understanding of legitimate authority. Similarly, Qutb’s notion of hakimiyyah politicizes 
divine sovereignty, but also sets it apart from the world. Can the two be bridged? The third 
and final section briefly explores some important anomalies in Qutb’s formulation, especially 
the cumbersome task of uniting the idea of a territorially and temporally-bound State (dawla) 
with a deterritorialized Islamic ‘nation’ (Ummah). This problem, as the Conclusion reveals, is 
at the heart of contemporary musings and contestations, both over the character and content 
of postcolonial Islamic states as well as the imagined spatialized zones of Islamicity or God-
based rule. 
Politicizing the Divine 
Sayyid Qutb is recognized more as an ‘Islamic’ ideologue than as a non-Western, religious 
thinker advancing an alternative conception of sovereignty.7 His intervention can be 
reasonably situated broadly within non-Western discursive spaces opened up by critiques of 
secularization. The rediscovery of the merger of the political and the theological in Western 
thought also allows a fruitful engagement with Islamic political theology, with Qutb as its 
important modern exponent. With the consolidation and spread of transnational Islamic 
public sphere (Salvatore 2007), Qutb’s project of Sovereignty acquires greater resonance 
despite concerted efforts to dismiss him as the ‘philosopher of Islamic Terror’ (Berman 
2003). His ‘realist utopia’ (March 2010) not only embodies the political-theological element 
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in Islamic political thought, but its maturation and growth under conditions of globalized 
modernity. Qutb’s reach into the transnational Muslim public sphere is facilitated by the 
faltering fortunes of postcolonial Muslim states, but especially the declining attractions of 
secular modes of governance, justice, or politics. Notable scholars (Haddad 1983; Abu Rabi 
1991 & 1996; Tripp 1994; Kepel 1994; Zimmerman 2004; Musallam 2005; Calvert 2009) 
depict Qutb, perhaps too readily, as an ‘ideologue’ of an Islamic revolution. Alternatively, he 
can be regarded as an integral part of Islamic political theology (March 2013) in its modern 
instantiation. Qutb’s problematic relation to modernity and his reliance on Scripture as the 
source of an Islamic model of state and society echoes several challenges confronting 
political theology in other cultural contexts. Qutb, like other ‘fundamentalists’, recognizes 
Islam as a complete ‘system’, a totally self-sufficient universe for moral and political 
guidance. This idea is articulated most forcefully in Qutb’s key work, Fi Zilal al-Qur’ān 
(1951–1965). Rather than accommodate Islam to modernity, as Muslim reformers propose, 
Qutb finds no need to look outside Islam itself: the Law is enshrined in the Qur’an and the 
Sharia. Divine Law provides all the necessary elements for structuring social and life-worlds, 
harmonizing conduct with natural human tendencies and potential, and developing human 
capacity through knowledge-seeking and Reason. Only in his political writings, Qutb 
expresses the inclination to move beyond mere social reform in his quest for establishing 
hakimiyyah. Both his social and political commitments are consistent with the intellectual 
challenges faced by postcolonial Muslim states, but especially their failed projects to replicate 
Western modernity and its institutions. In particular, the authoritarian make-up of Qutb’s 
Egypt under Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918-1970) and its secularist leanings, for Qutb, were 
wholly inconsistent with the ethos of Islam. This also explains Qutb’s wide appeal in the 
contemporary context since questions of political authority, dispensation of justice, and social 
and moral cohesion continue to plague postcolonial Muslim states.  
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A key step toward rejection of reformist accommodation is Qutb’s delegitimation of 
established religious authority. In this sense, Qutb can be regarded as a principal actor in 
advancing the decentralization and democratization of Islamic interpretation during the 20th 
century, a process that has acquired greater scope and intensity under 21st century globalizing 
conditions. The consolidation of a transnational Islamic public sphere under the aegis of 
social media is a central part of the landscape. As Robinson notes, “The authority of much 
scholarship from the past, has been rejected; the authority of the traditional interpreters, the 
‘ulama, has been marginalized” (2009: 340). Robinson’s observation somewhat exaggerates 
the extent of marginalization since the traditional ‘ulama remain important participants in the 
‘national’ religious public spheres in the ICZs, often setting the terms of political discourse 
and morality. However, in the ‘transnational’ realm, the decentralization and democratization 
of religious interpretation corresponds to Robinson’s categorical statement. As a result of the 
multiplication of interpretative centers in the ICZs, the distinction between established and 
lay religious authority has considerably weakened. Paradoxically, multiplication has been 
accompanied, not by a pluralist culture of heterodoxy, but oversimplification and 
homogenization of Faith. Complexity and ambiguity have been replaced by, what Jacob 
Burckhardt (1955 [1888-89]) writing in a different context calls those ‘terrible simplifiers’. 
The experience of the divine or the cultural richness of religious tradition have succumbed to 
mere Belief and ritual. Qutb’s wider appeal fits into this pattern in which lived practice and 
relaxed variants of interpretation succumb to stricter adherence and shaper divisions between 
‘true’  and ‘nominal’ believers.   
Although Qutb stands squarely within the tradition of Islamic political theology as its 
conservative exponent, he is actually a radical who seeks to delink Quranic interpretation 
from its classical roots. In this quest, in politicizing the divine, Qutb subordinates raison 
d’état to hakimiyyah (God’s rule). From a post-Westphalian perspective, Qutb repudiates 
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both the assumed separation between religion and state, and popular variants of sovereignty 
to hakimiyyah. Yet, Qutb is ambiguous over the question of the territorial state. In his 
unrelenting attacks on nominally ‘Islamic’ states which occupy large parts of his corpus, he 
does not specify whether his alternate design would dispense with the nation-state. In a sense, 
the tension between the Ummah and dawla remains unresolved in Qutb as with other 
proponents of a religiously-ordained state. God’s sovereignty assumes a despatialized form 
and Ummah can only correspond to the extent of the Muslim community. By contrast, dawla 
is always a temporal arrangement and territorial (Al-Barghouti 2008). Qutb is not oblivious 
to the distinction between divine and lay matters, unlike the fictionalized inseparability of the 
religious and the secular in Islam (Sivan 1985).  
Hakimiyyah and Jahiliyya 
In his latest book, The Shipwrecked Mind, Mark Lilla provides a discussion of the ‘political 
reactionary’ illustrated with figures such as Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin. Qutb 
approximates that description with the proviso that he proposes a clear break with Classical 
tafsir (Quranic interpretation) and its reformist interlocutors, although he himself spends 
several years writing long commentaries on the Qur’an which make up the main body of his 
religious writings. Seeking a modus vivendi between Faith and the compulsions of modern 
statecraft, reformist Islam for Qutb can only reveal its feebleness. The problem is that 
reformists accept the terms of discourse set by modernity; they are merely interested in 
modifying Islam to meet modernity’s challenge. Although Qutb subscribes to the primacy of 
Divine Law, he is a political modernist (Voegelin 1965); he seeks to release interpretation 
from established sources of legitimate religious authority, especially the ulama (religious 
scholars). Qutb does not identify himself with religious authority since the ‘ulama inevitably 
wish to historicize and contextualize the Holy Text, often to legitimate political regime of 
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their times. With a transcendental message, the Qur’an cannot remain trapped in historical 
circumstance.8 
Qutb’s Hakimiyyah appears to mirror the substantive content of Islam’s First Principle, 
namely Tawhid (unity). The core of this principle is the twin notion of Allah’s transcendent 
reality and indivisibility. Qutb’s principal aim is to subordinate social and political life to 
God’s law as enunciated in the Quran and Sunnah, not do away with that distinction:  
The division of human actions into “ibadat” (worship) and “muamalat” (transactions, 
social relations, dealings between peoples), which we find in the books of fiqh 
(jurisprudence), was introduced in the beginning merely for technical reasons in order to 
present different topics in a systematic manner. Unfortunately, with the passage of time, 
this produced the erroneous impression in people’s minds that the term “ibadah” 
(worship) applies only to those actions that are included under the title “fiqh al-ibadat” 
(jurisprudence of worship). This application of the term “ibadah” was a grave distortion 
of the Islamic concept.  
While Qutb’s seeks to rework Tawhid as hakimiyyah, conjoining the political and the 
theological, his reading of Tawhid is fairly orthodox:  
Islam begins by establishing the Oneness of Allah (Tawhid), as it is from Him that 
Life issues and unto Him that it turns. “Say; God is One…” (Qur’ān 112-114). 
Accordingly, there is no controversy or doubt about the origin of this universe . . . Out 
of the Will of this One God, the whole existence has been created in the same unified 
manner . . . There is no intermediary between Creative Will and the created beings, 
nor are there multiple ways of creation, but it is the Will referred to in the Qur’an by 
the word ‘Be’ that prevails . . . The One God reigns sovereign over all beings, to Him 
they turn for refuge in this life, and in the Hereafter . . . The universe, with its diverse 
ramifications has one origin from which it is issued . . . By one Supreme rule, this 
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universe has been thoroughly administered in a manner that precludes any collision 
among its parts . . . (Qutb, Islam and Universal Peace 1951).   
Qutb’s novelty is to allow Tawhid to transmute into God’s rule. In the presence of Divine 
sovereignty, ‘man-made’ political institutions look frail and flawed:   
The basic principle upon which the Islam system is based differs from the basic principles 
upon which all human systems are based. It is based upon the principle that sovereignty  
(hakimiyyah) belongs to God alone, and He alone legislates. The other systems are based 
on the principle that sovereignty belongs to man, and it is he who legislates for himself. 
These two basic principles do not coincide, and therefore the Islamic system cannot really 
coincide with any other system, and cannot be called anything but “Islam.” (Social  
Justice in Islam, in Shepard 1992: 220).   
The concept of hakimiyyah carries sufficient ambiguity to warrant elastic interpretation extant 
proponents of political Islam. Against the demands of hakimiyyah, all Muslim states acquire 
illegitimacy. Similarly, Qutb’s undefined boundaries of hakimiyyah allow his enthusiasts 
ample room to visualize post-national projects that have the potential to redraw the territorial 
map of the ICZs. The charms of an Islamic world-state cannot be too far behind. In this sense, 
Qutb increasingly appears as an unheralded theorist of post-Westphalian sovereignty. Qutb’s 
repudiation of Muslim political classes directly challenges the nation-state. It places them 
under severe political stress since they cannot, on Qutb’s reading, find legitimacy in modern 
projects of redistribution, social welfare, or modernization, a direct reference to Nasser’s 
Egypt with more contemporary relevance. In rejecting reformist Islam, Qutb’s choice of 
language is vital. Although his language is consistent with the language deployed by other 
proponents of political Islam, the deliberate use of hakimiyyah transmits added force. It gives 
the idea of sovereignty affective resonance fully in accord with the majesty of the Supreme 
Ruler. Secular authority on this image can only appear subordinate, lacking divine glory. 
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Qutb’s strategy of assigning newer meanings to older terms finds parallel in Blumenberg’s 
(1983) “reoccupation of concepts”. Bypassing Tafsir, helps Qutb reframe familiar Islamic 
concepts. Both hakimiyyah and jahiliyyah illustrate Qutb’s strategy that entails attempts to 
de-historicize and to decontextualize. Conceptual history breaks out of a linear mode. “One 
reason for Qutb’s effectiveness and influence,” writes Nettler, “was the profound, masterful 
integration of the Qur’ān in his thought” (1994: 102). Qutb’s impressive knowledge of the 
Islamic canon, but especially the deeper metaphysical moorings of the Qur’ān allowed him 
considerable autonomy to articulate newer meanings. The real effect of Qutb’s rhetorical 
achievement lies in affording political meanings to religious terms. By using the Qur’ān verse 
by verse Qutb seeks “to build a theory of, and a practical programme for, modern Islam” 
(Nettler: 104).  Qutb also parts company with traditional tafsir scholars by avoiding the 
classical style of writing. He opts for a writing style that can reach the Muslim publics. 
Eschewing formalism or established rules of rhetoric, Qutb’s bold contributions are deeply 
interwoven with his belief in the sovereignty of God, a belief becoming only stronger in the 
face of degrading circumstances, including Nasser’s brutal penitentiary.   
 Qutb does not began his career with a political-theological project. First and foremost, 
his interventions embodied the thinking of a social reformer concerned and agitated with the 
moral ills of society. It is in the later years that Qutb drew upon the South Asian thinker, Abul 
A’la Mawdudi, for conceptions of ‘Islam as a Total System” and hakimiyyah. Mawdudi’s 
totalizing discourse shifts Qutb’s horizon more explicitly toward political theology.9 Now, 
Islam is acknowledged not only as Faith, but as a complete system for organizing social and 
political worlds. Departure from this system, for Qutb, can only lead toward moral abyss, 
ignorance and decadence—features of jahiliyyah. Mawdudi provides room for elections and 
consultation (Nasr 1994). Qutb, on the other hand, depends entirely on a religiously-inspired 
leadership to guide the Ummah:  
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The whole question of human well-being depends entirely on who exercises control 
over human affairs. A train runs only to the destination determined by its driver. All 
passengers can travel only to the same destination, whether they like it or not. In the 
same way, the train of human civilization travels where those who exercise power 
dictate. (In the Shade of the Qur’an [Qutb 2002-9], vol. 6:149–150).  
Qutb, like Mawdudi, reads God’s attributes as political qualities, but unlike his 
counterpart he does not countenance any accommodation with ‘man-made’ laws, patterns of 
governance, or political expedience. Mawdudi’s direct involvement with a political party, 
procedural democracy, and alliance with the military to ‘Islamize’ Pakistan (Nasr 1997) 
stands in stark contrast to Qutb’s rejectionist stand, which eventually led to torture and death 
at the hands of an authoritarian regime.    
 In rejecting the authority of traditional authority, Qutb cultivates his own theoretical 
garden with hakimiyyah as its main attraction. A political modernist, Qutb is neither opposed 
nor resistant to Western science, the need for political legitimacy, but especially the 
expenditure of political power to realize his Islamic project. What is awkward for Qutb is the 
problem of operationalizing hakimiyyah in the modern state. To be sure, hakimiyyah is 
neither a Quranic concept nor a recurrent notion in classical interpretation. A closer 
inspection of the elements of hakimiyyah, however, can freely apply to conceptions of 
modern sovereignty. Qutb also discards any notion of the ‘two kingdoms’ since there can 
only be One. Reading God’s authority politically obviates the need for a secularized 
settlement. The source of all legitimate authority for Qutb is the Qur’an. Qutb bypasses 
Islamic law or jurisprudence as ultimate sources, but more significantly reconfigures the 
concept of jihad not as a defensive, but offensive, struggle to safeguard Muslim society 
(Khatab 2011). The main battle for Qutb is between hakimiyyah and jahiliyyah. In his 
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‘militant’ writings, Qutb’s also displays strong anti-Christian sensibilities, associating 
Christianity with jahiliyyah, which he regards as the principal corrosive force in history. 
The historical landscape for Qutb is a binary construction, characterized by an endless 
conflict between hakimiyyah and jahiliyyah. Qutb’s historical sociology traces the decline of 
hakimiyyah to the end of the golden age of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs. Muslim society 
has never managed to recover it; jahiliyyah has been a consistent feature of Muslim social and 
political worlds. Despite noteworthy achievements in science and technology, the West 
simply embodies a modern version of jahiliyyah. The defining feature of modernity for Qutb 
is the relegation of hakimiyyah to human reason. The political form of jahiliyyah is the 
modern nation-state since it arises out of a settlement between the divine and the worldly. The 
philosophical rationale behind hakimiyyah is Qutb’s appreciation of the constant human 
struggle between material and spiritual desires; jahiliyya negates the supremacy of spiritual 
desires:    
For the life drives cannot be suppressed in every instance, and the material necessities of 
life cannot be eternally conquered. Of necessity, humanity yields to the pressures of these 
drives most of the time. Indeed, the perpetual suppression of life’s drives is not good, 
because Allah has created life, and he has not done so in vain, nor has he created life for 
humans to neglect or hinder its development. Undoubtedly, it is good for humanity to 
exceed its physical necessities and transcend its desire, but not to disregard life in the 
process. The soundest and safest way is to unleash the constitutive potentiality of human 
nature so that humanity can supersede the humiliating submission to its physical 
necessities. This is the aim of Islam when it unites the physical necessities and the 
passions of the spirit into a system, securing absolute individual liberty with inherent 
feeling and practical possibility, neglecting neither (Social Justice in Islam: 35).  
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Qutb’s refutation of traditional religious authority draws from his Quranic reading of 
human capacity to make autonomous sense of the universe, albeit, with divine guidance. 
Recognition of that capacity also explains Qutb’s plea for political activism, or jihad against 
jahiliyyah. But the world of jahiliyyah cannot be undone with ascetic indifference, passivity, 
or personal salvation. Direct political action, directed by belief in hakimiyyah, is a necessary 
element to prevent Muslim society from falling into further decline and turpitude. Qutb melds 
his early commitments to social reform to wholesale restructuring of society and state in his 
conception of hakimiyyah. Qutb’s equates Christian ideas of personal salvation with shirk 
(idolatry). Hakimiyyah does not permit human-directed salvation. In a similar vein, Islamic 
jurisprudence (Fiqh) is subservient to the Qur’ān and the Sunnah—the only sources of true 
authority. 
The world of modernity in Qutb’s design is dualistic and, therefore, unable to liberate 
humanity from the allure of materiality or worldly power. True freedom is only possible 
when materiality is kept under check. Hakimiyyah alone offers the right passage to freedom 
since it resonates with the human desire for spirituality. Once surrendered to God’s rule, 
humans can attain perfection. Their dependence on materiality can guarantee neither freedom 
from want nor freedom from fear. Modernity’s answer to the human quest for freedom lies in 
materiality, an unquenchable quest. Placing hakimiyyah at the core of human existence 
liberates humanity. Spiritual happiness is not a personal matter, but ordained with Divine 
Guidance.  
  Qutb’s concept of hakimiyyah is tangled with Mawdudi’s advocacy of Islam as a 
‘total’ system, not as just belief or ritual, or even religious practice, but as an integrated, 
holistic framework of awareness and conduct:  
Islam, which is mandated to organize the totality of human life, does not attend to the 
diverse aspects of that life blindly or randomly, nor does it treat them as fragments or 
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parts. This is because it has a universal, integrated concept of the physical universe, 
life, and humanity, from which all the divisions and detailed expositions begin and 
return, and to which are linked all its theories, legislation, prohibitions, rituals of 
worship, its social relations. All these things are founded on this universal integrated 
concept. Islam does not improvise an opinion for every given occasion, or treat every 
given problem as separate from the rest of the problems (Social Justice in Islam: 28).   
  For Qutb, the ‘naturalness’ of Islam arises from its integrated view of all existence. 
God’s authority unites cosmological, political, and social spheres into a seamless order. Only 
by taking God’s authority as the constitutive principle for organizing human affairs produces 
social harmony, peace, and material and spiritual happiness. In contradistinction, jahiliyyah 
seeks to circumvent God’s authority either by erecting worldly idols or by peripheralizing the 
human desire for spirituality in favor of material desire.  
Received accounts situate Qutb within an unbroken chain of social reformers 
delimited by “the recurring impulse to renew the faith, to return to pristine origins, to shed the 
accretions of time and clime, and to recapture the vigor and simplicity of prophetic times” 
(Binder 1988: 170). Qutb’s vision is different. He shows no inclination to excavate modernist 
impulses within his Faith or to modernize Islam with the secularist make-up of the Nasserite 
state. Qutb’s model rests on his attachment to Islam’s first generation (Salafi), including the 
Four Rightly Guided Caliphs10.  
Islam cannot fulfil its role except by taking a concrete form in a society, or more 
precisely, in a nation. Men do not listen, especially in this age, to an abstract theory which 
is not materialized in a living society. From this point of view, we can say that the 
Muslim community has been extinct for a few centuries, for this Muslim community does 
not denote the name of a land in which Islam resides, nor is it a people whose forefathers 
lived under the Islamic system at some earlier time. It is the name of a group of people 
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whose manners, ideas and concepts, rules and regulations, values and criteria, are all 
derived from the Islamic source, so that that the Muslims’ way of life is an example to all 
Mankind, just as the Messenger is an example to them: “And thus We made of you a 
community justly balanced that you may be witnesses over the nations, and the  
Messenger as witness over yourselves.” [Qur’ān 2:143] (Milestones 7).  
 As mentioned, Qutb reframes hakimiyyah as God’s rule, or jahiliyyah as a world of 
pagan ethos. The key point is that Jahiliyyah is no longer allotted its original meaning, 
namely as the state of ignorance and moral decline in pre-Islamic Arabian society but as any 
condition deviating from hakimiyyah.  Hence, jahiliyyah connotes godless communist 
societies, Western ‘democratic’ societies, but also Muslim states that are Islamic only in 
name.  
To escape the limitations of the nation-state, Qutb advances instead his own variant of 
humanism in which all differences between races and ethnicities are shunned. This humanism 
is predicated on an unconditional surrender to hakimiyyah. Qutb sees a natural harmony 
between the Divine’s commandments and human action. Acceptance of hakimiyyah as the 
First Principle opens up unlimited potential for human flourishing. The spiritual and material 
dimensions of cosmic existence need to be harmonized. In this context, Qutb’s unwavering 
rejection of Islamic mysticism appears consistent, since on this view mysticism is one-
dimensional; it refuses to fully acknowledge of materiality as an equal aspect of the cosmic 
order. Echoing Mawdudi, Qutb advances a necessary link between din (faith) and dunya 
(worldliness) for the Muslim community to flourish. Qutb’s anti-pietistic proclivities are 
connected to his critique of mysticism as the source of realizing God’s sovereignty.  His 
important treatise, Milestones (1990), clearly articulates political activism both to establish a 
just social order and to conform that order to God’s Will.  
17 
 
 The question of Qutb’s ambivalence toward modernity lies at the heart of any 
meaningful scrutiny of his political theology. Exposed to modernity’s apparent 
manifestations, both in the United States and the postcolonial context, he is acutely aware of 
modernity’s material and ideational possibilities. How does Qutb reconcile his unshaken faith 
in Divine sovereignty with modernity’s productions, especially the nation-state? A believer in 
political activism, he cannot disregard the necessary linkage between politics and an idealized 
Islamic order. Despite his vociferous attacks on the State, Qutb recognizes its unavoidability, 
both to provide social cohesion and religious belonging (Milestones 7) Qutb’s ‘realist utopia’ 
(March 2010), therefore, is this-worldly despite its divinely-inspired foundations. ‘This-
worldly’ is not the same thing as secular, but it is a domain closely intertwined with divine 
purpose. Ultimately though, a legitimate social and political order can only rest on Divine 
Sovereignty (Nettler 1996). Though Qutb shuns the idea of personal salvation, he places 
considerable responsibility upon the individual believer to navigate the (modern) social 
world:  
The believer holds on to his din [faith] like the holder of a precious stone in a society 
devoid of religion, of character, of high values, of noble manners, and of whatever is 
clean, pure, and beautiful. The others mock his tenacity, ridicule his ideas, and laugh at 
his values, but this does not make the believer weak of heart. He looks from his height at 
those who mock, ridicule and laugh, and he says, as did Noah, one of the great souls, who 
preceded him on the long and bright path of faith: “You ridicule us! Yes indeed we shall 
ridicule you as you ridicule.” [Qur’ān 3:196–197] (Milestones 125).  
The individual believer’s responsibility derives from God-given attributes of conscience, 
Reason, and self-knowledge. In discovering the secrets of the material world, the believer can 
spin into action (harakah), a prerequisite of social and moral renewal. Qutb, however, is 
unwilling to allow humans to interrogate the metaphysical world which is God’s prerogative. 
18 
 
Knowledge and self-knowledge must respect humility, which assumes that God alone is All-
Knower. Human beings cannot adopt a privileged stance in the endeavor to know. In fact, 
Qutb’s conception of jahiliyyah rests on the idea that any practice that authenticates the 
primacy of humans powers is shirk. At best, human powers are derivative and subsidiary. 
Faith is always superior to Reason, since Reason comes as a benefaction from God.  
Qutb’s unqualified Faith places him at odds with all Islamic traditions seeking to 
harmonize the Revealed Text with Reason, especially in certain forms of Islamic mysticism 
and Neo-Platonist Islamic philosophy. It also leaves the challenge of modernity unanswered: 
how can Qutb embrace the scientific and technical aspects of modernity without also 
embracing Immanence on which modernity rests? Qutb’s attempted solution is to politicize 
the Divine, which then allows him to subordinate all other human activity as derivative. 
Qutb’s ‘political Islam’, therefore, is not the project of mere Islamization, but radical 
transformation. In reading sovereignty within God, he can advance his totalizing vision. 
Action, then, geared toward the fulfillment of Divine Sovereignty is wholly legitimate.  
The above interpretation requires a few addenda. In placing confidence in the individual 
believer, Qutb recognizes ethical constraints that are decreed in the Qur’an. Believers cannot 
choose any action as they please once they have acknowledged hakimiyyah, positionality 
much in vogue among several brands of extremists. While Qutb’s jihad is both defensive and 
offensive, he is not merely the ‘philosopher of terror’. Rather, he finds in believers sufficient 
cognitive capacities to acknowledge hakimiyyah as a deliberate act of belief, not blind 
adherence to an abstract principle. Qutb expends considerable energies to reason, persuade, 
and convince with argument after argument. A prisoner of his times, he is no stranger to 
prejudice towards the Other his world inhabits. In the final analysis, though, it is the 
Nasserite state that is his enemy. Given its pathologies of autocratic rule, moral laxity, and 




Qutb’s resolution for translating hakimiyyah into a realizable project is not 
straightforward. In several instances he is inclined to redefine the nation-state. For him, “a 
Muslim’s fatherland is where the Islamic faith, the Islamic way of life, and the  
sharia of Allah are dominant. Only this meaning of ‘fatherland’ is worthy of human beings.” 
In this vein, Qutb revisits the notion of ‘nationality’ which “means belief and a way of life, 
and only this concept is worthy of man’s dignity” (Milestones 109). His departure from 
received meanings of a territorial state and political identity corresponding to it reverberates 
with Islamic notions of the nation as a religious community. However, Qutb leaves the 
boundaries of an Islamic state undefined. This omission presents his contemporary followers 
enormous license to conceive of an Islamic state only as a post-Westphalian state, neither 
marked by fixed inside/outside demarcations, nor isomorphic relations between territory and 
identity. 
 Qutb’s crusade to achieve a more just society aligned with hakimiyyah rests on his 
rejection of pietistic solutions. However, moral rectification is a necessary ingredient in the 
journey toward the establishment of an Islam order. Both jihad and da’wah (Call to Faith) are 
aspects of this journey. The distinctive element here is Qutb’s self-awareness that moral 
exhortation in itself cannot effectively confront jahiliyyah. Reformist Islam places its hopes 
in purification, but one that is negotiated within the framework of political compromise and 
accommodation.  
Qutb’s elevation of the political to a higher status collides with conventional notions 
of deliberation or conciliation. To the degree that political is “a transcendent category as well 
as a mundane one, as Nettler notes,” it was imperative that “the Godly Islamic community 
was necessary on earth for cosmic as well as for earthly reasons” (Nettler 1994: 108). The 
Qur’ān offers supreme direction, but it lies plainly upon Muslim leadership (qiyada) to 
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execute God’s Will. For Qutb, it “was a combination of revealed truth and the political and 
social application of that truth—Shari’a or aqida or almanhaj al-Islami” (Nettler 1994: 108) 
to materialize hakimiyyah. The philosophical sources of Qutb’s project set it apart from other 
variants of political Islam since in Qutb’s case it has a “metaphysical imperative within a 
general cosmological conception,” as Nettler stresses: “Qutb’s ‘political Islam’ has a very 
different look and rationale. It pertains not only to the allegedly deracinated modern Muslim 
society and its problems in the period of decolonization, but to a larger order of God’s 
organization of the cosmos” (1994:114).  
Approaching Qutb as a political thinker first and a religious thinker second, allows access 
to the political content of his worldview. Both jahiliyyah and hakimiyyah are to be seen, then, 
as political concepts in the guise of religious language. Qutb’s political theology, hence, 
seeks a new frontier, neither of secularization nor sacralization. If at all, it is the interjection 
of the political into the religious that defines Qutb’s project. Binder is unaware of Qutb’s 
political-theological attachments despite his reading of Qutb’s philosophical inclinations:  
Qutb insists that speculative idealism, and deductive intellectualist systems not derived 
from immediate religious experience, are characteristic forms of contemporary jahiliyya. 
Theoretical systems which are derived from worldly praxis and material existence alone 
are equally jahili. In this way Qutb rejects not only Marxism, but also Western 
philosophy, the medieval philosophies of Islam, and much Islamic legal reasoning, 
claiming that they represent the most insidious and reprehensible forms of the jahili 
attack on Islam (1988:179).  
Missing in Binder’s analysis is appreciation of the centrality of the political in Qutb’s 
‘political Islam’. Indeed, if the political is approached directly as an unmediated zone of 
agonism, contestation, conflict, and annihilation, Qutb would meet the necessary criteria. 
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However, as a proponent of ‘political’ Islam that only seeks to Islamize state and society does 
not accurately capture Qutb’s intent.  
   How does Qutb resolve the problem of reconciling the claims of the Ummah with the 
territorial imperatives of dawla? Qutb’s writings convincingly express his ambivalence 
toward the nation-state as an ideal container of Muslim identity. Rather, his Islamic 
cosmopolitanism presents a different mapping, especially in Milestones:  
The homeland of the Muslim, in which he lives and which he defends, is not a piece 
of land. The nationality of the Muslim, by which he is identified, is not the nationality 
determined by the government. The family of the Muslim, in which he finds solace 
and which he defends, is not blood relationships. The flag of the Muslim, which he 
honors and under which he is martyred, is not the flag of the country. And the victory 
of the Muslim, which he celebrates and for which he is thankful to Allah, is not a 
military victory. It is what Allah has described: “When Allah’s help and victory 
comes, and you see people entering into the religion of Allah in multitudes, then 
celebrate the praises of your Lord and ask His forgiveness. Indeed, He is the Acceptor 
of Repentance.” [Qur’ān 110:1–3] (Qutb, Milestones: 108).   
 
 Two sets of tensions permeate Qutb’s political theology: the relation between 
modernity’s immanent ethos and Transcendence; and the unresolved question of harmonizing 
the Ummah with dawla. In the first instance, Qutb is unable to reverse modernity both in its 
historical and institutional senses. Modernity is not a cyclical process or a temporary phase in 
the flow of events. As discontinuity and rupture modernity ushers in a world of fractured 
identities, coalescing humanity into discrete containers. Qutb’s attempted escape from the 
spatio-temporal attachments of modernity can either produce nihilism or regression. Neither 
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option is attractive to Qutb. The challenge for him and similar interlocutors is reject 
Immanence altogether without ushering in nihilistic projects of annihilation and death. 
 Conversely, the question of realizing the Islamic community politically inevitably 
confronts the territorial imperatives of the state. The available theoretical solution is an 
Islamic world-state. However, this solution entails conflict and hostility toward difference or 
tolerance, with limitless potential for violence directed at others who pronounce cultural or 
religious refusal. Qutb’s intended cosmopolitan urges collide against religious exclusivism. 
While the community of believers cannot be fully contained within dawla, it is only ‘nation-
state’ that can guarantee realization of Muslim identity, albeit inflected by particular 
vernacular correlates. Given the heterogeneity within the Ummah, that may indeed be the 
only viable option.   
Conclusion 
Qutb’s political theology presents a radical contrast to largely expedient ideational and 
behavioral practices of the Islamic political classes. Muslim leaders offer regular 
pronouncements on the need to harmonize Islam with statecraft, but their publicized 
adherence to Islamic principles is a mere sham. For Qutb, political rule in the ‘Islamic’ world 
is illegitimate. The perceived relevance of Qutb’s indictment is not limited to his spatio-
temporal universe, but it also finds widespread reception in contemporary contexts. Qutb is 
also exonerated by the authoritarian consistency in Muslim political practice. His repudiation 
of personal salvation is also welcomed since Qutb provides little space for political elites to 
display outward piety without fulfilling the true meaning of Faith.   
In broader context, an exploration into Qutb’s political theology shows that his theology is 
always already political (unlike the reformists or Schmitt's version which is juridical and is 
about sovereignty's transcendence). Curiously, this reading suggests that Qutb is not pleading 
for a theological politics but a political theology within modernity with all the contradictions 
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inherent in such a project. Qutb displays an aversion toward Western modernity, but his 
project of transmuting modern sovereignty into hakimiyyah keeps him strictly within the 
modernist fold. Without an awareness of the assumed powers of the Leviathan and the 
exceptional nature of the sovereign, he would be unable to notice attributes in God that are 
neither sanctioned by Text or Tradition. Like Mawdudi, Qutb is able to construct a totalizing 
discourse in the shadow of the modern state, both in its colonial and postcolonial 
instantiations.  
The terrain of sovereignty in the non-Western cultural zones is fraught with paradoxes and 
anomalies attending projects of matching territory and identity, an experience not alien to the 
Western world. A chief limitation of received thinking is the modularity of the Protestant 
settlement presumably enshrined in the Westphalian compromise. The inescapable and 
apparently more visible presence of religion, notably, in the ICZs, casts serious aspersions on 
the universality of both Westphalia and secularization claims, but also sacralisation. Yet, the 
immanent character of modernity produces strange solutions for protecting or promoting the 
spaces of religiosity. It is neither the ‘return’ of religion nor ‘revival’ that captures sustained 
commitments to Faith in the midst of modernity’s advances and seductions.  
Qutb’s political theology raises important questions, both for conventional understandings 
of ‘political Islam’ and postcolonial sovereignty. Adhering to an unapologetic belief in 
Islam’s self-subsistence, Qutb defies the political logic of reformism. He remains 
unconvinced that accommodation or compromise with secular or secularized political 
authority would create the preconditions for Islamic renewal and renaissance. Battling 
opposing forces on several fronts—welfare, social reform, justice, or governance, Qutb 
ultimately settles on his own version of political theology as a panacea. A centerpiece of that 
political theology is Hakimiyyah that can liberate the Islamic community from the alluring 
advances of jahiliyya. Divine sovereignty, for Qutb, is not a political slogan, but a programme 
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for spiritual renewal, recovering the original ethos of Islam. Paradoxically, his political 
reading of God’s sovereignty leaves the main political problem unresolved, namely the 
constitution and governance of community with imperfect mortals. Within the polluting 
environment of modernity, can a new salafi generation emerge that can spurn modernity’s 
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3 These zones are generally “Muslim-majority areas informed by transnational subjectivities loosely connecting 
varied Islamic societies around symbolic commonality, memory and historical experience. The term stressed the 
plurality of Islamic cultural experience, albeit distinguished by recognizable semiotic markers, without 
essentializing Islamic identity” (Pasha 2017: xiii). 
 
4 According to Qutb, “Authority belongs to the exalted God exclusively by virtue of His divinity. For sovereignty 
(al-hakimiyya) is among the characteristic features of divinity. Whoever lays a claim to sovereignty—whether its 
is an individual, a class, a party, an institution, a community or humanity at large in the form of an international 
organization—disputes the primary characteristic of His Divinity. And whoever does so is guilty of disbelief in 
the most blatant manner….Laying claim to this right [to sovereignty] does not necessarily take a particular form, 
which alone might be deemed to remove the claimant from the fold of ‘the true faith’ (al-din al-qayyim [Q 
12.40]….Rather, one lays claim to it…simply by…deriving laws from a source other than [God]….In the 
Islamic system, it is the community that chooses the ruler, thereby giving him the legal right to exercise authority 
according to God’s law. But [this community] is not the source of sovereignty which gives the law its legality. 
God alone is the source of sovereignty. Many people, including Muslim scholars, tend to confuse the exercise of 
power and the source of power. Even the aggregate of humanity does not have the right to sovereignty, which 
God alone possesses. People only [have the right to] implement what God has laid down with His authority. As 
for what He has not laid down, it is neither authority nor legality”. Fi Zilal al-Quran, 6 vols. (Beirut, 1974), iv. P. 
1990 (commentary on Q 12.40) cited in Zaman (2015: 393-394). 
 
5 I am thankful to one of the anonymous reviewers for this important point. 
 
6 As Qutb states in Ma’ alim: “The fundamentals upon which the components of life and its systems are based 
indicate that the world today is living in jahiliyyah. It is the jahiliyya which could not be reduced by anything of 
this huge material facility, or by this magnificent material development. This jahiliyyah is based on 
transgression. It transgresses the authority of Allah on the Earth. It transgresses the rights of hakimiyyah 
(Sovereignty), the most specific characteristics of uluhiyyah (divinity). It depends on the hakimiyyah 
(Sovereignty) of people and makes a number of them lords to the others. This is not in the naïve fashion known 
to the first jahiliyyah, but in the form of the claim that they have the right to design conceptions, and values, laws 
and system separable from the program of life sanctioned by Allah” (cited in Khateb 2006: 168). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
